It is widely accepted that local amenities affect neighborhood house prices, the amount of capitalization depending on the demand and supply of the amenity. Local public school quality is among the most important local amenities and it is clear that public school quality varies spatially by significant amounts. A large body of literature investigates the relationship between house prices and public school quality. Over the years, proficiency tests have replaced expenditures as the most widely accepted measure of school quality in house price hedonic regressions. But education and labor economists increasingly claim that school achievement is not the proper measure of school quality. Instead, the literature increasingly looks to growth over time in student achievement or value-added to measure the quality of a school.
According to Meyer (1997) , "The indicators commonly used to assess school performance-average and median test scores-are highly flawed. They tend to be contaminated by student mobility and by nonschool factors that contribute to student achievement (e.g. student, family, and community characteristics and prior achievement)…The conceptually-appropriate indicator of school performance is the value-added indicator. The value-added indicator measures school performance using a statistical model that includes, to the extent possible, all of the nonschool factors that contribute to growth in student achievement. The objective is to statistically isolate the contribution of schools to student achievement growth from these other factors."
The value-added approach argues that a school is responsible for the additional knowledge that it imparts to its students. It is not responsible for the students' innate aptitudes or their parents' characteristics. Therefore, "good" schools are not necessarily the ones with the highest test scores, because high levels of achievement may simply reflect parents' characteristics. Instead, a good school is one with a high value-added: a school that takes the students it is given and adds significantly to their knowledge.
Many researchers in the labor and education economics literatures have adopted the value-added approach. Among the early works in the area are Boardman and Murnane (1979) and Aitkin and Longford (1986) . More recent works in this expanding line of research include Hanushek and Taylor (1990) , Hanushek (1992) , Gomes-Neto et al. (1997) , Hunt-McCool and Bishop (1998), and Figlio (1999) . State governments are increasingly focusing on the value-added of schools by measuring the gain in student test scores, including South Carolina, Tennessee, California, Texas and Kentucky. Some states have begun to provide financial incentives to schools that score well on these measures.
Even if public policy and large portions of the education and labor economics literatures adopt value-added measures, we question whether households care more about value-added than about levels of school achievement. The housing market can help decide this question, and it can also reveal the relative importance of peers, parents, and the school-specific component of public school quality. However, little work has been done in this area.
Capitalization of school quality into house prices affects many households. In the fourth quarter of 2001, 68.0 percent of U.S. households were homeowners (U.S. HUD 2002, Table 27 ) and there were over 73 million owner-occupied housing units. We find that house prices vary by about 20% when comparing a school district with student achievement that is one standard deviation below the mean to a district with achievement that is one standard deviation above the mean. This variation in house price has a substantial impact on household wealth. Assuming an average house value of $185,000, a two standard deviation increase in school quality implies an increase in the average homeowner's wealth by $37,000.
2 Thus, the issue about capitalization of school quality into house prices affects many U.S. households and the size of the impact is substantial. Further study of what aspects of school quality are capitalized is needed.
We decompose student achievement into a parent component, a peer component, and a school input component. Using a data set of 27,000 housing transactions in the state of Ohio, we include these three components of school quality in a hedonic house price regression. We find that house prices are affected most by the impact of a community's parental characteristics on school achievement. School specific peer effects also influence house prices, but to a much smaller degree.
Variations in purchased inputs across school districts have little impact on student performance and we find, correspondingly, that they have little effect on house prices.
We therefore find very little support for the use of value-added measures of school quality when explaining spatial variation in house prices.
I. Literature
Early studies of the relationship between house prices and the quality of local education used public school expenditures per pupil as the key school characteristic, probably because outcome measures such as test scores were not available (e.g., Oates 1969 ). Rosen and Fullerton (1977) argued that proficiency test scores are a better measure of school output. Subsequent research generally uses K-12 student achievement measures in studies of house value capitalization. 3 Haurin and Brasington (1996) use the pass rate on a ninth grade statewide proficiency test to measure student achievement.
Another reason for the change from using expenditures per pupil to student outcomes as the key measure of school quality was that the education production function literature found that school inputs have little or no impact on student outcomes (Hanushek 1986 . The consensus opinion is that parental inputs are the dominant factor in determining K-12 academic outcomes. The impact of a third input, peer group effects, continues to be debated in the literature (Betts 1996) , but most evidence suggests peer effects occur in grades K-12. 4 Recently, Zimmer and Toma (2000) found strong evidence of peer effects in five countries in a study of math achievement. Hayes and Taylor (1996) argue that the impact of school quality on house values derives from the marginal effect of schools on educational outcomes; that is, the valueadded of a school. Using Dallas data, they test three models: one based on per pupil expenditures, the second based on average achievement in the sixth grade, and the third based on the marginal impact of schools' value-added on achievement. Their value-added model decomposes observed average achievement at time t in the j-th school district (A jt ) into the expected effect derived from parental inputs and a school district specific residual:
(1) A jt = b o + b 1 P j + b 2 A jt-1 + e j where P j represents parental characteristics, A jt-1 is the prior year's achievement, and e j is the random error in district j. 5 Hayes and Taylor assume the value-added by a district is the sum of the estimated value of the constant and the predicted value of the district's error term. They claim that these terms capture all nonparental inputs to school outcomes. 6 Using a small sample of 288 observations of house prices, they first test whether school expenditures affect house values, but they find no impact. They also test for the impact of average school achievement on house values and find a statistically significant effect. However, when they decompose school achievement into "value-added" and the expected achievement based on P j and A jt-1 , they find that only value-added has an impact on house prices. They conclude that homeowners are not willing to pay for residing in the same district as parents or students with a particular set of characteristics; rather, they are only willing to pay for school-specific attributes. Brasington (2000) finds that Ohio proficiency test scores are positively capitalized into house prices. Sieg et al. (1999) find that math proficiency test scores are positively related to the price of California housing in 1987-1995.
II. A Model of House Prices and K-12 Public School Outcomes with Peer Group Effects
Our basic model assumes that house prices reflect the market values of structural attributes of housing, neighborhood characteristics, and selected aspects of a community's K-12 public education (Rosen 1974) . We assume a standard form for the empirical hedonic house price function: We adopt the education production function approach and initially assume that educational attainment is produced with parental inputs (P i ), school inputs (S j ), innate child factors (F i ), and peer effects (R j ). We assume the production function's form is additively separable, implying that parental inputs have the same impact on attainment no matter which school district is selected.
(3)
A ij = a A0 + a AP P i + a AS S j + a AF F i + a AR R j
When a household selects a school district, the set of peers in the district is exogenous, thus peers take on the attribute of a district-specific fixed effect. The valueadded hypothesis, now expanded to include all district-specific effects, argues that house values are influenced by both a district's purchased inputs and the educational impact of a district's group of student peers; that is, V j = a AS S j + a AR R j .
Testing the hedonic price model requires observations of house prices, house and neighborhood characteristics, and a school district's educational outcomes, inputs, and peer effects. Although V j is not directly observed, it can be estimated from (3).
While our data set reports individual house prices and characteristics, our data on student outcomes, parent characteristics, and school inputs is at the school district level. 10 Students' innate abilities and peer effects are unobserved.
Aggregating (3) to the district level implies:
A j = a A0 + a AP P j + a AS S j + a AF F j + a AR R j where A j is average student achievement, P j is the average of parental inputs, and F j is the average of innate abilities of children in the district.
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Addressing the lack of observations of innate student abilities requires an assumption about the distribution of ability among students. Omitting F j from an estimation based on (4) results in omitted variable bias (Hanushek 1979) and is generally assumed to upward bias the coefficients of the parental characteristics variables (Zimmer and Toma 2000) . We note that parents and their children are jointly mobile, and neither is part of the value-added of a school. This observation allows us to assume that students' innate abilities are a stochastic linear function of parental characteristics, with no loss of generality in terms of testing our focal hypothesis. We replace F j in (4) by a constant, a linear term in P j , and a random error ε j , yielding:
A j = a A0 + a AP P j + a AS S j + a AR R j + ε j with a A0 and a AP appropriately redefined.
While the above assumption addresses the problem of unobserved innate characteristics, a possible problem is that parents select a school district based on the innate abilities of their children, inducing a correlation between F j and S j or R j . We argue that this behavior is unlikely. Utility maximizing parents will optimize their choice of schools by selecting the best school district they can afford given the market's implicit price for the educational quality of the locality. 12 Also, parents rarely send children of differing ability to different schools providing evidence that parents are not sorting among school districts based on their children's innate abilities.
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The quality of peers may be correlated with other factors explaining student achievement; specifically, with average parental characteristics or with a school district's purchased inputs. In general, we assume the statistical relationship can be described as follows:
where R j measures peer effects and e R is a mean zero random error.
Knowing the values for parental, school, and peer inputs to education, we substitute into the house price function (2), yielding:
ln H ij = c H0 + c HX X ij + c HP P j * + c HS S j * + c HR R j * + η ij .
The variables P j *, S j *, and R j * represent measures of the impact of P j , S j , and R j on student achievement; they are not the raw values of these variables. That is, (8) P j * = â AP P j ; S j * = â AS S j ; R j * = â AR R j .
Peer effects are difficult to observe and if R* is omitted from (5) or (7), the remaining coefficients may be biased. 14 The consequences for tests of our hypotheses are twofold. First, the expected values of the coefficients of P and S in the education production function when R is omitted are E(â AS ) = a AS + a AR d RS and E(â AP ) = a AP + a AR d RP (Kmenta, 1986: 450) . It is plausible that a AR > 0, d RS > 0, and d RP ≥ 0, yielding upward bias in the coefficients of P and S in (5) . This bias causes measurement errors in P* and S* as shown by inspecting (8). However, these measurement errors are the same multiple for all observations, thus the t-statistics and goodness of fit measure of these variables when inserted in the house value equation are unaffected; only the coefficients' values are affected. In addition, testing described later suggests that, for our sample, any bias that has been introduced by omitting peer effects is small. The implications of the omission of peer group effects from (7) for interpretation of the house value estimation are more serious. Even if P* and S* are measured without error, the expected values of the key coefficients in (7) We address the issue of unobserved peer effects by using multiple observations of each district's educational outcome, with n designating the n-th observation in district j, n = 1…N. Instead of (5) we estimate:
(9) A jn = a A0 + a AP P j + a AS S j + ε jn .
Because all the observations of test scores in a district occur at the same time, the values of P j and S j do not vary over n. Another implication of the invariance of P j and S j across the multiple observations for a district is that a fixed effects model cannot be estimated using this data set.
Using (5) and (6), we find that the estimation residual for the n-th observation of district j in (9) is:
(10) A jn -Â jn = a AR e Rj + ε jn .
The first term on the right hand side of (10) is the coefficient of the peer group effect in the educational attainment equation multiplied by the random error of equation (6) . The second term is the random error in the education production function. Of course, the expected value of A jn -Â jn in the full sample is 0; however, the expected value of A jn -Â jn in the j-th school district is a AR e Rj ≠ 0. This nonzero value occurs because e Rj in (9) is common to all N observations of the j-th district. The key point is that, for each district, we have multiple observations of the component of the peer group effect in (6) that is not correlated with either parental influences or district inputs. We define R' = a AR e Rj and discuss its estimation in the next section of the paper.
Next, we substitute R' for R* in the house value equation (7) Because, by construction, R' is uncorrelated with P and S, its inclusion does not affect the expected value of the estimates of ĉ HP and ĉ HS , thus they may be biased. However, the coefficient of R' is an unbiased estimator of the coefficient of R* yielding an estimate, ĉ HR , of the impact of K-12 public school peer groups on house values. If ĉ HR = 0, student peers do not affect house values, and in this case, the coefficients of P* and S* in (11) are unbiased. Otherwise, some bias may be present depending on the size of the coefficient of R'.
The value-added model argues that both school inputs and peers affect house values. It also argues that parental effects on student achievement have no effect on house values. Our analysis of biases indicates that the coefficient of P* in (10) may be nonzero even if there are no underlying parental effects. Thus, our key tests for the value-added hypothesis are of the values of c HS and c HR . Support for the value added hypothesis requires these coefficients to be positive, statistically significant, and reasonably large. Downes and Zabel (2002) and Brasington (1999) find that average achievement levels are significant when explaining house values while their measures of value-added are not. We modify (11) to test the hypothesis that households use average student achievement to determine their bids for housing:
(12) ln H ij = ∀ H0 + c HX X ij + ∀ HA A j + η Aij .
III. Data and Estimation
House price observations are based on transaction data for 1991 and are drawn from six urban areas in Ohio (Amerestate 1991 Haurin and Brasington (1996) , who list detailed definitions in their data appendix.
Measures of school inputs in the education production function include the teacher-pupil ratio, teacher education (percent with MA degrees, percent with more education than a BA but less than a MA), teacher experience, the dropout rate, the attendance rate, and expenditures per pupil. Measures of parental inputs include their education (percent not finishing high school, percent completing high school but no further education), percent in poverty, average real income, percent two-parent families, percent Black, percent Hispanic, percent resident in the community for less than six years, and the percent homeowners.
House characteristics include lot size and its square, number of rooms and its square, garage size, number of full and half baths, house age and its square, and dummy variables for the presence of pools, decks, fireplaces, and air conditioning.
Neighborhood variables include average household income, the crime rate, the percentage of minority households, and the effective property tax rate. House values tend to vary throughout the year so we include quarterly seasonal variables, omitting spring. We also include five dummy variables for the six major urban areas in Ohio that are the source of our data (Cleveland, Cincinnati, Columbus, Akron, and Dayton, omitting Toledo).
We first estimate the education production function in (9) for 123 districts and three test score results and calculate the residuals following (10). The average residual for each district is our estimate of R', the peer effect. 17 We then create P j * and S j * based on the estimation results. Finally, we estimate the house price equations (11) and (12), after correcting for heteroskedasticity.
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IV. Results
The estimation results for the reduced-form education production function are in Table 1 . Due to the cross-sectional nature of the data, fixed and random effects models are inapplicable. However, the results of a Bera and Jarque (1980) test and correlation of regressors with residuals suggest that ordinary least squares is appropriate in this instance. The Bera and Jarque test cannot reject the null hypothesis of normally distributed errors for two of our three test grades, and previous education production functions using a similar data set have also passed this test for an absence of omitted variable bias (Brasington, 2002b) . 19 As a further check, we note that omitted variable bias is a problem of the error term being correlated with included regressors. The correlation with least squares residuals is less than 0.10 in absolute value for all explanatory variables in all test sections, further suggesting that ordinary least squares will provide relatively unbiased parameter estimates.
All else constant, we find that the greater the percentage of parents with less than a high school degree or with only a high school degree, the lower are student test scores. The higher the percentage of parents in the district that are Black or Hispanic, the lower are average test scores. The greater the mobility rate in the district, the lower are test scores. Among the school input variables, the only significant findings are that the dropout rate is negatively related to test passage and that student attendance is positively related to test passage. Variations in real expenditures per pupil do not have a significant impact on test scores.
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
The estimate of the baseline hedonic house price equation in (11) is presented in 
Spatial Statistics Approach
It is of course possible that our regressions omit factors important to the explanation of house prices. Downes and Zabel (2002) find that failing to account for unobserved effects does not bias the parameter estimates of the school quality variables, and our baseline model has included MSA dummies to capture any omitted influences that differ across urban areas. Still, Downes and Zabel's finding may be specific to their data set, and MSA dummies may be inadequate controls for omitted variable bias. Therefore we employ spatial statistics as a more sophisticated technique for addressing omitted variable bias.
House price hedonic regressions with individual sale prices tend not to be statistically independent. In fact, tests for statistical independence often show spatial autocorrelation in the residuals. Such spatial autocorrelation is to be expected: the price of a given house is similar to the price of nearby houses, and this similarity diminishes with distance. Moreover, non-housing determinants of house value are not fully captured by the variables included in the hedonic regressions (LeSage 1997 (LeSage , 1998 .
Estimating a house price hedonic with ordinary least squares does not account for spatial dependence between observations, which may lead to biased, inefficient and inconsistent parameter estimates (Anselin, 1988, p. 58-59) . A study by He and Winder (1999) demonstrates bi-directional price causality between three adjacent housing markets in Virginia, illustrating a case of spatial dependence in housing markets.
The spatial Durbin model can address the problem of spatial dependence in house value regressions (Pace and Barry, 1997a) . 21 The spatial Durbin model includes a spatial lag of the dependent variable v as well as spatial lags of the explanatory variables in X:
(13) v = ρWv + Xβ +WXα + ε where ε ~ N(0,σ 2 I n ). In (13) the scalar term ρ is the spatial autoregressive parameter. It measures the degree of spatial dependence between the values of nearby houses in the sample. The W term is an n by n spatial weight matrix. It has non-zero entries in the i,jth position, reflecting houses that are nearest neighbors to each of the i homes in the sample. In this manner the spatial weight matrix W summarizes the spatial configuration of the houses in the sample. 22 Next, X is the explanatory variable matrix X with the intercept excluded, and α is the parameter associated with the spatial lag of the explanatory variables.
The Wv term in (13) captures the extent to which the price of each house is affected by the price of neighboring houses (Bolduc et al., 1995; Griffith, 1988, p.82-83) .
For example, when a house is put on the market, the offer price is often set with the knowledge of the selling price of similar houses in the neighborhood. Multiple listing services publish offer prices and newspapers publish sale prices, thus offers and bids on houses are be influenced by offers and bids on nearby houses.
The WXα term in (13) allows the structural characteristics of neighboring houses to influence the price of each house. A common saying in real estate is to never own the largest (or the smallest) house on the block: the market will force such a house to sell at a discount, an example of the type of impact captured by WXα. The WXα term allows other structural characteristics of neighboring houses to affect the sale price of each house. Glower, et al. (1998) find that the degree that a house is atypical influences its time on the market and sale price, so it may be important to incorporate the structural characteristics of neighboring houses into the house price hedonic.
The WXα term also captures the influence that the neighborhood characteristics of nearby houses have on the sale price of each house. Crime may impose negative externalities and therefore spill over across city boundaries. In addition, the tax competition literature suggests that the tax rate charged by a neighboring taxing jurisdiction will affect the tax rate chosen by the home jurisdiction, which may in turn affect house prices. The WXα term allows for these types of spillovers.
The log-likelihood for the model in (13), concentrated with respect to the parameters β and σ, takes the following form (Anselin, 1988, p. 181; Pace and Barry, 1997a ): The need to compute the log-determinant of the n by n matrix (I n -ρW) makes it computationally difficult to solve the maximum likelihood problem in (14). Operation counts for computing this determinant grow with the cube of n for dense matrices.
However, the matrix W is sparse. The sparsity of W may be exploited (Pace, 1997; Pace and Barry, 1997a) so that a personal computer can handle the 27,233-observation regression with computational ease. The Cholesky decomposition is used in Barry and Pace's (1999) Monte Carlo estimator to compute the log-determinant over a grid of values for ρ restricted to the interval [0,1].
The sparse spatial Durbin procedure has been demonstrated to greatly improve cross-sectional regression estimates that are spatial in nature Pace and Barry, 1997b) . Part of the improvement stems from incorporating the influence of omitted variables (Anselin, 1988, p.103; Pace, Barry and Sirmans, 1998 Griffith (1988, p. 94-107) .
The results for the spatial model are reported in the lower panel of Table 3 
V. Conclusions
Our results reject the hypothesis that the market price of housing reflects the value added to student achievement by a school district. We find that the coefficient of the variable measuring the impact of school inputs on student achievement is small and it is not consistently statistically different than zero in house value regressions, particularly in regressions that control for the effects of omitted variables.
We find evidence that households value the quality of peer group influences in a school district; however, the impact is small. A change in the peer effect from one standard deviation above the mean to one standard deviation below the mean lowers house values by 1.3 percent, this equaling about $1,100 in our sample.
We find that positive parental influences on student achievement are highly valued in the housing market. A change in the parental influence measure from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean implies a 20 percent increase in house value. We also find that the average level of student achievement performs nearly as well as a decomposition of student achievement into peer, parental, and school effects in the house price estimation.
These findings must be interpreted in the context of the hedonic price model. We know from Rosen's 1974 analysis that the coefficients in the hedonic housing price equation reflect market values, not supply or demand. Interpretations of why the housing market values particular inputs or outputs are speculative. Still, it is tempting to suggest that average student achievement affects house prices because it is readily observable. Peer effects and school effects are less easily observed, so households seem to use more easily observed parental characteristics (race and education) or proficiency test outcomes as the key factor in comparing public school quality among school districts.
From an empirical perspective, it is much easier to include a district's proficiency test scores in a hedonic house price estimation than to include a set of school inputs and proxies for peer group effects or parental characteristics. Thus, we find support for the increasingly common practice of including K-12 test scores as a control variable in hedonic house price equations.
If the own-parent impact on the education of a child is portable among school districts, why are parents' attributes valued in the housing market even when controlling for racial composition, crime rates, household income, and tax rates? Perhaps parental characteristics, such as high levels of education, are valued because these parents continually apply pressure to school administrators for better performance and for delivery of a high quality education. Using Rosen's underlying framework for hedonic models as guidance, the results suggest that the set of communities with favorable parent characteristics may be in short supply compared with household demand, bidding up their market price.
Our results suggest that the school-specific component of school quality, that is, the value-added of a school, is not highly valued by the housing market. If the housing market provides a valid assessment of the value-added approach to measuring school quality, our results question the use of value-added in the education and labor economics literatures. However, our results do not necessarily make value-added an inappropriate measure of school quality for policymakers. Policymakers may wish to reward schools for improvement, rather than for absolute levels of achievement. Still, our results suggest that the value-added of a school is not the measure of school quality that homeowners use when they decide which house to buy. The mean of the log of house price is 11.23. Brasington (1999) also uses a spatial autocorrelation model to estimate house prices and still finds proficiency levels more consistently capitalized, but the results are weaker.
9 Our assumed form of educational production function is the same as that made by Zimmer and Toma (2000) .
10 Only twelve of our 123 school districts have more than one high school, so the 9 th and 12 th grade outcomes are observed at the individual school level for over 90% of the sample. 11 We assume that children are distributed equally among households in the district.
12 Epple and Romano (1998) discuss the evidence about the differential impact of peers on students of differing innate ability levels. They conclude that there is no compelling empirical evidence supporting any particular differential impact.
13 Altonji and Dunn (1996) find no evidence that siblings of differing motivation level and ability attend different schools. Only 20% of their sibling sample attended different schools, and most of those cases involved relocation and divorce. In only five percent of their sample did one sibling attend private school while another did not. Other studies assume that omitted ability of a child does not bias parameter estimates because innate ability may be "unknown to parents, or, if known, may not be acknowledged in the decision process [of parents]" (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1994, p. 678 ).
